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WEAPONIZING CITIZEN SUITS: SECOND 
CIRCUIT REVISES THE BURDEN OF PROOF 
FOR PROVING SHAM CITIZEN SUITS IN 
APOTEX v. ACORDA THERAPEUTICS 
Abstract: In 2016, in Apotex Inc. v. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a generic 
drug company could not rely solely on the timing of the Food and Drug 
Administration’s (“FDA’s”) disposition of a citizen suit and approval of a 
generic application to state a claim under the Sherman Act based on sham 
litigation. By contrast, in 2009, in In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust 
Litigation, the Second Circuit held that precisely such evidence was suffi-
cient to state a Sherman Act claim. This Comment argues that the Second 
Circuit’s revision of the burden of proof for showing a sham citizen suit 
incentivizes brand-name drug companies to file sham citizen suits as a 
means to extend their monopolies, which would harm both generic drug 
manufacturers and the American public. Given the competitive and public 
health ramifications associated with regulating prescription drugs, it is cru-
cial that U.S. courts give sufficient weight to the underlying policies behind 
consumer-protection statutes such as the Hatch-Waxman Act and the Sher-
man Act in order to avoid unintentionally harming the public.  
INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, brand-name drugs are typically sold at a signifi-
cantly higher price than their generic counterparts.1 The separate approval 
processes at the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) for marketing 
brand-name and generic drugs are one reason for this price discrepancy.2 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Facts About Generic Drugs, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/
BuyingUsingMedicineSafely/UnderstandingGenericDrugs/ucm167991.htm [https://perma.cc/62V8-
JLMR] (setting out basic facts with respect to generic drugs). The average price of a generic drug 
is between eighty and eighty-five percent cheaper than the price of its brand-name counterpart. Id.; 
see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-12-371R, SAVINGS FROM GENERIC DRUG USE 
1, 4 (2012) (reporting on the amount generic drugs have saved the public compared to brand-name 
drugs); Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jonathon J. Darrow, Hatch-Waxman Turns 30: Do We Need a Re-
Designed Approach for the Modern Era?, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 293, 293, 295 
(2015) (explaining that lower-cost generic drugs, which make up eighty-four percent of all U.S. 
drugs prescribed but account for less than twenty percent of drug costs, have saved over one tril-
lion dollars in healthcare costs from 1999–2010). 
 2 See Facts About Generic Drugs, supra note 1 (distinguishing the market approval process 
for generic drugs from that required of brand-name makers). Unlike brand-name drugs, the Food 
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One crucial difference between the brand-name and generic approval pro-
cesses is that an application to market a generic cannot legally be filed with 
the FDA until after the corresponding brand-name drug’s exclusivity period 
has expired.3 As a result of this regulatory dichotomy, brand-name drug 
manufacturers retain a monopoly in the market until the first generic com-
petitor is able to receive FDA approval to enter the market.4 This creates a 
strong incentive for brand-name manufacturers to interfere with the generic 
approval process in order to preserve their monopolies, whether through 
filing meritless lawsuits to tie up the generic drug manufacturer’s resources 
or by paying the generic manufacturer to delay filing its applications with 
the FDA.5 
In May 2016, in Apotex Inc. v. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York’s dismissal of a generic 
competitor’s claim that a brand-name manufacturer had filed a sham citizen 
petition with the FDA in order to delay its generic drug’s application before 
the FDA, which would constitute an anticompetitive act in violation of Sec-
                                                                                                                           
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) only requires generic manufacturers to show that their drug has 
the same effects in the human body as the brand-name drug (a feature known as “bioequiva-
lence”). Id. Thus, generic manufacturers need not submit clinical trial data, which are both ex-
tremely time-consuming and expensive to gather. Id. Moreover, generic manufacturers also typi-
cally face lower advertising and marketing costs compared to brand-name manufacturers. Id. 
 3 Richard B. Racine, The Interplay Between U.S. Pharmaceutical Patents and FDA Law, FIN-
NEGAN: MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Dec. 2010), http://www.finnegan.com/resources/
articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=ad4b058b-0150-4ec7-90f4-57e6641272a6 [https://perma.cc/N3JF-
VDT5]. Exclusivity rights were originally designed to strike an important balance between pro-
moting innovative research and development for brand-name drugs and allowing for competition 
from generics upon expiration of the brand-name drug’s exclusivity period. Drug Price Competi-
tion and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman Amendments): Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 1 (2003) (statement of Daniel E. Troy, Chief Counsel, 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration). 
 4 See Generic Drugs: Questions and Answers, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/Resources
ForYou/Consumers/QuestionsAnswers/ucm100100.htm [https://perma.cc/4SKK-VZKD] (noting 
that most brand-name drugs are protected for twenty years under a patent and that as a result, other 
drug companies may not begin making or selling the protected drug until after its patent has ex-
pired). 
 5 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CON-
SUMERS BILLIONS 1–3 (2010) (summarizing the economic costs “pay-for-delay” agreements im-
pose on consumers and recommending federal legislation to prohibit pay-for-delay agreements). 
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has recently cracked down on pay-for-delay cases in-
volving brand-name companies who offer generic competitors lucrative payments in exchange for 
delaying the filing of their generic applications. Id.at 1, 3; Robert A. Lipstein et al., Observations 
on Brand Name-Generic Sham Litigation Disputes and Settlements, AIPLA ANTITRUST NEWS 
(AIPLA Comm. on Antitrust Law), May 2008, at 15 (exploring the tension between brand-name 
and generic drug manufacturers that Congress created by enacting the Hatch-Waxman Act in 
1984); see also FTC v. AbbVie Inc,, 107 F. Supp. 3d 428, 430 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (detailing FTC 
allegations against patent holder of a brand-name testosterone drug that patent litigation was sham 
litigation initiated in order to delay entry of a generic into the market). 
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tion Two of the Sherman Act.6 A citizen petition directs the FDA’s attention 
to specific concerns over a drug’s safety or efficacy and asks the FDA to 
take some particular action with respect to that drug.7 Relying on recent 
FDA guidance, the Second Circuit conceded that, although it was conceiva-
ble that the brand-name manufacturer’s citizen petition might have been a 
sham filing, dismissal of the Sherman Act claim was nevertheless proper 
because the generic competitor had not pled sufficient facts in support of its 
antitrust claim.8  
This Comment argues that, notwithstanding the fact that the FDA ulti-
mately denied the brand-name manufacturer’s citizen petition, the Second 
Circuit’s decision is likely to incentivize brand-name drug companies to file 
self-interested sham citizen suits for the sole purpose of delaying or alto-
gether precluding generic competition.9 If brand-name manufacturers file 
citizen suits with greater frequency and volume, generic competitors would 
suffer direct harm, but the public at large would also be harmed in the form 
of higher drug prices and diminished choice.10 Part I of this Comment ad-
dresses the FDA’s treatment of generic and brand-name drugs, citizen peti-
tions in the pharmaceutical context, relevant U.S. antitrust doctrine, and the 
factual and procedural history of Apotex.11 Part II reviews the status of the 
law in the Second Circuit regarding sham citizen suits pre-Apotex, and the 
manner in which recent FDA guidance factored into the Second Circuit’s 
most recent sham citizen suit decision.12 Finally, Part III examines the likely 
fallout from Apotex, including its prospective impact on generic and brand-
name pharmaceutical manufacturers, U.S. antitrust law, and public health.13 
                                                                                                                           
 6 823 F.3d 51, 61–62 (2d Cir. 2016). In the same case, the Second Circuit also affirmed the 
District Court with respect to Apotex’s second claim against Acorda, holding Acorda was not 
liable for violating the Lanham Act’s prohibition on false advertising as the company had not 
made any representations that were literally false or likely to mislead consumers. Id. at 67–68. 
 7 Michael A. Carrier & Daryl Wander, Citizen Petitions: An Empirical Study, 34 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 249, 251 (2012); see also 21 C.F.R. § 10.30 (2016) (authorizing parties to submit a citizen 
petition to the FDA upon meeting certain requirements). 
 8 See Apotex, 823 F.3d at 60–62 (explaining that the FDA Guidance for Industry tends to 
undermine any inference drawn based on timing that the citizen petition was a sham and was de-
ployed anticompetitively); FDA, OMB 0910-0679, CITIZEN PETITIONS AND PETITIONS FOR STAY 
OF ACTION SUBJECT TO SECTION 505(Q) OF THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT: 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY 13–14 (2014) [hereinafter GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY] (explaining that 
the FDA prefers not to rule on a citizen petition until after it has decided whether or not to approve 
the associated Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) to preserve the procedural rights of 
generic applicants). 
 9 See infra 75–88 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra 85–88 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra 14–54 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra 55–74 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra 75–88 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE PHARMACEUTICAL DRUG INDUSTRY AND ANTITRUST LITIGATION 
 The pharmaceutical industry is heavily regulated and features a great 
deal of litigation between brand-name and generic drug companies at the 
confluence of intellectual property law and antitrust law.14 Section A of this 
Part briefly examines the role of the FDA, explains the crucial differences 
between the approval processes for brand-name and generic drugs, and ex-
plores the incentives that brand-name drug manufacturers have in light of 
the current regulatory regime.15 Section B of this Part explains the role of 
citizen petitions within the pharmaceutical industry and how brand-name 
drug companies have strategically deployed these petitions to extend their 
monopolies.16 Section C of this Part provides an overview of U.S. antitrust 
law with a focus on the Sherman Act and one of its major exceptions, the 
Noerr-Pennington immunity doctrine.17 Finally, Section D of this Part 
summarizes the procedural history of Apotex, a recent Second Circuit case 
involving allegations of anticompetitive sham litigation in the prescription 
drug context.18  
A. The FDA and Drug Regulation in the United States 
In the United States, the FDA is tasked with safeguarding the nation’s 
health by reviewing human drugs, medical devices, and food to ensure that 
they are both safe and effective.19 For its review purposes, the FDA distin-
guishes between new brand-name drugs and generic drugs with unique ap-
proval processes in place for evaluating each.20 To receive U.S. marketing 
                                                                                                                           
 14 See Carrier & Wander, supra note 7, at 251 (noting that some of the pharmaceutical indus-
try’s greatest challenges come with respect to patent terms and the onset of generic competition). 
 15 See infra 19–28 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra 29–34 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra 35–45 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra 46–54 and accompanying text. 
 19 About FDA: What We Do, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/default.htm 
[https://perma.cc/RN9N-SYYA] (setting out the FDA’s mission statement and regulatory respon-
sibilities). The FDA, a federal administrative agency, is also responsible for ensuring the safety 
and efficacy of biological products, veterinary drugs, cosmetics, and radiation-emitting products. 
Id. 
 20 See The Drug Development Process, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Approvals/
Drugs/default.htm [https://perma.cc/BHJ8-9LAH] (explaining that the typical process for a brand-
name manufacturer involves preclinical trials to determine a potential compound’s safety and 
efficacy, followed by four graduated stages of clinical trials involving a greater number of human 
participants and longer terms of observation); see also Abbreviated New Drug Application (AN-
DA), FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedand
Approved/ApprovalApplications/AbbreviatedNewDrugApplicationANDAGenerics/ [https://perma.
cc/8VJ2-BKM6] (providing a high-level overview of the Abbreviated New Drug Application). To 
avoid duplicating the efforts of brand-name drug developers, a generic applicant need only 
demonstrate as part of its ANDA that its generic produces the same results as the brand-name drug 
in the human body, a feature known as “bioequivalence.” Id. 
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approval, brand-name drugs must provide years of data from pre-clinical 
(animal) and clinical (human) trials to prove that their drug products are 
safe and effective.21 In contrast, generic drug manufacturers can avoid sub-
mitting their own pre-clinical and clinical data altogether and need only 
show that their drug contains the same active ingredient and has the same 
effect in the human body as their brand-name counterpart.22  
The presence of generic drugs provides a lower cost alternative to 
brand-name drugs and the prevalence of generics decreases prescription 
drug costs overall, an effect that Congress intended in 1984 when it passed 
the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 
(popularly known as the “Hatch-Waxman Act”).23 The Hatch-Waxman Act 
amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (“FDCA”) to, among 
other things, facilitate and expedite generic entry into the market by creat-
ing a new, quicker approval process for generics known as the Abbreviated 
New Drug Application (“ANDA”).24 In passing the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
Congress sought to strike a balance between two competing public policy 
goals: protecting brand-name drug manufacturers’ return on investment on 
the one hand, and ensuring consumer access to lower cost alternatives upon 
the expiration of the brand-name drug’s exclusivity period on the other.25 
Owing to the higher degree of risk and expense inherent to filing an 
Investigative New Drug Application (“IND”), brand-name manufacturers 
are rewarded with a limited (in time only) exclusivity period free from ge-
neric competition upon receiving FDA market approval for their brand-
                                                                                                                           
 21 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.20–.38 (2016) (setting out the Investigational New Drug Application 
(“IND”) process and describing the phases of investigational studies required for new drugs); see 
also Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates of R&D 
Costs, J. HEALTH ECON., May 2016, at 20–22 (estimating that in 2013, the average total cost to 
obtaining FDA marketing approval for a brand-name drug was approximately $2.6 billion, with 
the vast majority of the out-of-pocket costs attributable to conducting pre-clinical and clinical 
trials). 
 22 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012) (creating the ANDA, an expedited system for approving gener-
ics). 
 23 Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 1, at 297, 301. The Hatch-Waxman Act arose out of 
Congress’s frustration with the existing regulatory framework for prescription drugs, which made 
it relatively difficult for generic manufacturers to get their lower-cost copies approved for sale in 
the market. Id. at 297. Congress, in passing the Hatch-Waxman Act, also sought to lower drug 
costs in order to mitigate adverse health outcomes caused by patients who tried to save money on 
high-cost brand-name drugs by reducing their normal drug regimens. Id. at 300. 
 24 See 21 U.S.C § 355(j) (creating the ANDA approval process for generics). In filing an 
ANDA, a generic drug company must show that their drug contains the same active ingredient as 
the brand-name drug and is bioequivalent to the brand-name drug. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv). 
 25 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments), supra note 3. The Hatch-Waxman amendments also created a limited 180-day peri-
od of market exclusivity for generics that meet certain criteria, in effect immunizing these generics 
from competition for a period of time from subsequent generic versions of the same drug. Id. at 3–
4; see also 21 U.S.C § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (defining the 180-day exclusivity period). 
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name drug.26 The duration of a brand-name drug company’s monopoly de-
pends in part upon the length of their exclusivity period, which is deter-
mined based upon the type of chemical compound the brand-name drug 
contains and is expressly set out in FDA regulations.27 After the exclusivity 
period expires, a brand-name drug company can retain its monopoly until 
the FDA approves a generic competitor’s ANDA.28 
B. Citizen Petitions 
A citizen petition is a submission to the FDA which requests that the 
agency take some action in light of a particular drug’s safety or efficacy.29 
Specifically, citizen petitions allow any “interested person” to ask the 
Commissioner of the FDA to “issue, amend, or revoke a regulation or or-
der” or “take or refrain from taking any other form of administrative ac-
tion.”30 Citizen petitions may be filed to challenge a product on scientific or 
legal bases, before or after the FDA has reviewed the product.31  
Brand-name drug manufacturers are the most common filers of citizen 
petitions with the FDA, and usually request that the FDA deny a generic 
                                                                                                                           
 26 See Racine, supra note 3 (explaining that once a brand-name drug company receives ap-
proval from the FDA, they are awarded with an exclusivity period). The exclusivity period that the 
FDA grants is independent from any patent monopoly the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(“PTO”) grants, and essentially allows the brand-name drug company to enjoy a limited monopoly 
for a period of years completely free from generic competition. Id.; see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.108 
(2016) (setting out the technical requirements to be considered in deciding the length of the exclu-
sivity period for different drug products). 
 27 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(b)(2) (stating that brand-name drugs that contain a “new chemical 
entity” enjoy five years of exclusivity from the date of FDA approval); Frequently Asked Ques-
tions on Patents and Exclusivity, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/
ucm079031.htm [https://perma.cc/JB88-JF5W] (stating that drugs intended to treat rare diseases 
are granted seven years of exclusivity). 
 28 See 21 U.S.C § 355 (creating a process by which generic manufacturers can obtain quicker 
lower-cost approvals than ever before); Henry Grabowski et al., Recent Trends in Brand-Name 
and Generic Drug Competition, J. MED. ECON., Dec. 2013, at 1 (finding that the average actual 
exclusivity period in one study enjoyed by brand-name drugs introduced between 2011 to 2012 
was just under thirteen years). Prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic manufacturers were bur-
dened with redundant requirements, engaging in many of the same studies and trials brand-name 
drug companies already performed in order to generate the safety and efficacy data then required 
by the FDA for market approval. Grabowski, supra at 2. 
 29 Carrier & Wander, supra note 7, at 251; see 21 C.F.R. § 10.30 (2016) (setting out the re-
quirements for the submission of a citizen petition to the FDA). 
 30 21 C.F.R. § 10.25(a); see 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2012) (requiring government agencies to allow 
the public to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule); 21 C.F.R. § 10.30 (setting 
out the requirements for the submission of a citizen petition to the FDA). The citizen petition 
arose as a byproduct of both the First Amendment’s guarantee to the right to petition and the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act’s requirement that government agencies allow the public certain par-
ticipatory rights with respect to agency rulemaking. Carrier & Wander, supra note 7, at 259–60. 
 31 Apotex, 823 F.3d at 57. 
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competitor’s pending ANDA.32 Brand-name drug manufacturers, however, 
are increasingly utilizing citizen suits for self-interested strategic business 
and competitive reasons, and not for the purposes for which the citizen peti-
tion was originally created.33 Indeed, there is empirical evidence that gener-
ally speaking, citizen petitions filed with the FDA add little if any value to 
the analysis of a particular drug.34 
C. Relevant U.S. Antitrust Laws 
In the United States, antitrust law is codified in three federal statutes: 
the Sherman Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the Clayton Act.35 
The earliest of the three, the Sherman Act, was enacted in 1890 and con-
tains two key prohibitions: Section One, which proscribes agreements in 
restraint of trade, and Section Two, which proscribes unilateral conduct di-
                                                                                                                           
 32 See id. (stating that citizen suits were originally designed to allow the public to have a voice 
in the drug approval process, but that a number of pharmaceutical companies have taken ad-
vantage of the system to file meritless petitions in order to delay their generic competitors from 
receiving FDA approvals); Carrier & Wander, supra note 7, at 252, 271 (finding that from 2001 to 
2010, brand-name drug companies filed sixty-eight percent of all citizen petitions with the FDA, 
seventy-eight percent of which were directed against generic companies). 
 33 See Apotex, 823 F.3d at 57 (noting the recent misuse of citizen suit petitions by a number of 
pharmaceutical companies through the filing of meritless petitions in order to delay generic com-
petitors from receiving FDA approval); In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 
677, 695 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that plaintiff class of purchasers of a medicinal drug sufficiently 
stated a claim for sham litigation against the drug’s manufacturer and one of its licensees); see 
also Carrier & Wander, supra note 7, at 252, 270–71 (noting that one explanation for the fact that 
only nineteen percent of petitions were successful between 2001 and 2010 was that many petitions 
were filed to delay generic entry, as was the case for the drug Ambien, whose approval was de-
layed by 1,225 days as a result of a citizen petition). 
 34 See Carrier & Wander, supra note 7, at 261–62 (explaining that many citizen petitions are 
filed on questionable grounds and that it is very rare that a citizen petition will raise a new issue 
that has not already been fully considered by the FDA). 
 35 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2012); Federal 
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2012); The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, 
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws [https://
perma.cc/RR7P-CUH7]. The Clayton Act was passed in 1914 and prohibits mergers and acquisi-
tions that tend to create a monopoly. Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 and 29 U.S.C.). The Federal Trade Commission Act, also 
passed in 1914, sweeps more broadly, and generally prohibits unfair and anticompetitive methods, 
acts, or practices. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2012)). Thus, in practice, any behavior that violates the Sherman 
Act would also be found to violate the Federal Trade Commission Act and would be enforceable 
by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”). See 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (authorizing the FTC to charge 
those who are or have been employing unfair methods of competition or deceptive acts or practic-
es affecting commerce in the public interest). See generally Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering 
Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551, 552–53 (2012) (noting that U.S. antitrust law is unique 
compared to other countries in vesting private antitrust plaintiffs with certain advantages to en-
courage private enforcement of antitrust claims, including broad discovery, the availability of 
treble damages, and the ability to bring antitrust claims as a class action). 
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rected towards monopolization of a market.36 Specifically, Section Two 
confers liability on parties who “shall monopolize, or attempt to monopo-
lize . . . any part of the trade or commerce among the several States.”37 
Although the literal text of the Sherman Act seems absolute, the courts 
have interpreted Section Two with some elasticity to exclude from antitrust 
liability certain activities that, for example, involve petitioning the legisla-
ture or the executive to take action.38 The common-law doctrine excepting 
certain petitioning activities from antitrust liability under the Sherman Act 
is known as Noerr-Pennington immunity, after the two seminal Supreme 
Court cases in which the doctrine was developed.39 The Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine in essence ensures that individuals’ First Amendment rights to peti-
tion are protected and not infringed by the enforcement of U.S. antitrust 
laws.40 Under the Noerr-Pennington immunity doctrine, a party may be ex-
empt from antitrust liability if they petition the government, even if such a 
petition, if granted, would result in an antitrust violation.41 Noerr-
Pennington immunity, however, does not cover petitioning of governmental 
bodies if they are a mere sham meant to interfere with a competitor’s busi-
ness.42 
In that vein, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
in 2009 in In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation held that, 
although filing a citizen petition under the FDCA is ordinarily immunized 
under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, filing a sham citizen petition with the 
                                                                                                                           
 36 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2012) (codifying the Sherman Act’s prohibitions against agreements 
in restraint of trade and anticompetitive unilateral conduct). Congress passed the Sherman Act in 
1890 as a comprehensive statute aimed at protecting free and unrestrained competition, and Sec-
tion One of the Sherman Act makes it a felony to engage in contracts, combinations, and conspira-
cies in restraint of interstate or international trade. The Antitrust Laws, supra note 35. 
 37 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
 38 See E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 136 (1961) (em-
phasizing that associations to persuade government action are different in kind from the price-
fixing agreements, boycotts, and market-division agreements that are normally held to be viola-
tions of the Sherman Act). 
 39 Id.; see also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 664–65 (1965) 
(holding that collective efforts to influence public officials do not constitute an antitrust law viola-
tion, even if they were intended to eliminate competition); In re DDAVP, 585 F.3d at 685–86 
(referring to the immunity as the Noerr-Pennington doctrine). 
 40 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE NOERR-PENNINGTON 
DOCTRINE 3 (2006) (noting that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine guides courts in their interpreta-
tion of the Sherman Act in a way that promotes democratic government). 
 41 Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, “Sham” Exception to Application of Noerr-Pennington Doc-
trine, Exempting from Federal Antitrust Laws Joint Efforts to Influence Governmental Action 
Based on Petitioning Administrative or Judicial Body, 193 A.L.R. Fed. 139, § 2(a) (2004). The 
Supreme Court has found Noerr-Pennington immunity to apply to petitioning efforts directed at 
both the legislative and executive branches, and even petitioning before courts and administrative 
agencies. Id. 
 42 Id. 
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FDA is akin to filing sham litigation and is therefore not protected behavior 
and may constitute a violation of Section Two of the Sherman Act.43 The 
Second Circuit has stated that in order for a citizen petition to be a sham, a 
claimant must show that the citizen petition was both an objective and sub-
jective sham.44 Thus, in order for the filing of a citizen petition (or litiga-
tion) to lose its Noerr-Pennington immunity and constitute a sham, in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act, it must be both objectively baseless, as judged 
from the perspective of a reasonable person, and be motivated by the filing 
party’s attempt to directly interfere with a competitor’s business.45 
D. Procedural History of Apotex v. Acorda Therapeutics 
In 2007, prior to the filing of the instant lawsuit, Apotex (“the generic 
manufacturer”) submitted an ANDA to the FDA in which it sought approval 
to market its generic formulation of Zanaflex Capsules.46 Zanaflex is the 
brand-name of tizanidine, a drug used to treat spasticity, a condition com-
mon in patients with multiple sclerosis, Parkinson’s disease, and other cen-
tral nervous system injuries.47 
In early September 2011, while Apotex’s ANDA was still pending re-
view with the FDA, Acorda Therapeutics (“the brand-name manufacturer”) 
filed a citizen petition pursuant to 21 C.F.R. § 10.30, challenging Apotex’s 
claims of bioequivalence in its generic application and alleging that its pro-
posed generic label contained misleading or false statements.48  
In December 2011, Apotex filed a complaint in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York against brand-name manu-
                                                                                                                           
 43 585 F.3d at 685–86 (holding that a single sham petition may be treated as a single sham 
litigation). Although a single lawsuit that is both an objective and subjective sham can give rise to 
antitrust liability, petitions to administrative agencies are within the scope of the sham exception 
to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine so long as they are not “essentially political.” Kottle v. Nw. 
Kidney Ctrs., 146 F.3d 1056, 1062 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 44 In re DDAVP, 585 F.3d at 694. 
 45 Id.; see Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 61–62 
(1993) (explaining that proof of a sham only eviscerates the lawsuit’s legal viability and the plain-
tiff still must prove all of the elements of the antitrust violation in order to prevail on a Sherman 
claim). 
 46 Apotex, 823 F.3d at 57. Zanaflex was first marketed in tablet form and approved by the 
FDA in 1996. Id. at 56. Although Apotex and Acorda Therapeutics each received FDA approval 
to market their versions of tizanidine tablets, the two companies were motivated to produce a 
capsule version in order to reduce one of the principal side effects of their tablets, drowsiness. Id. 
 47 Id. at 57. 
 48 Id. at 57–58. Acorda’s citizen suit was filed after it lost a 2007 patent-infringement suit 
against Apotex, a suit which involved a dispute over methods of administering the very tizanidine 
capsules which were the subject of Apotex’s ANDA. Id. With Acorda’s patent-infringement suit 
no longer hindering Apotex’s ANDA, Acorda’s citizen petition challenging Apotex’s claims of 
bioequivalence in its ANDA created one last hurdle for Apotex to overcome in its quest to have its 
generic approved by the FDA. Id. 
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facturer Acorda, alleging that Acorda had violated Section Two of the 
Sherman Act by filing a sham citizen petition as a way to limit competition 
in the market for its tizanidine capsules.49 On February 3, 2012, while Apo-
tex’s antitrust suit was still pending in district court, the FDA approved 
Apotex’s ANDA and denied Acorda’s citizen petition.50 Apotex amended its 
pleadings in the antitrust action, relying heavily on the near-simultaneity of 
the FDA’s decisions, arguing that one could infer from the sequence of 
events that but-for Acorda’s citizen suit, the ANDA might have been ap-
proved sooner, meaning that the citizen suit delayed approval of the ANDA.51 
The district court noted, however, that although the FDA’s near-
simultaneous approval of the generic application and its denial of the brand-
name manufacturer’s citizen petition was indeed evidence in favor of the 
plaintiff’s claim, it was insufficient on its own to state a claim for a viola-
tion of the Sherman Act.52 The district court observed that, because Con-
gress had expressly ordered the FDA not to allow citizen petitions to delay 
ANDA reviews, it was unlikely that the citizen petition Acorda filed actual-
ly delayed Apotex’s ANDA.53 The United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York subsequently granted the brand-name manu-
facturer’s motion to dismiss with respect to the Sherman Act claim.54 
II. PHARMACEUTICAL DRUG ANTITRUST LITIGATION  
IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
The pharmaceutical industry is particularly ripe for antitrust claims and 
counterclaims given the statutorily created monopolies that brand-name 
drug companies enjoy by virtue of their exclusivity periods.55 In May 2016, 
in Apotex Inc. v. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit refused to extend antitrust liability to Acorda, a 
brand-name drug manufacturer that had allegedly filed a citizen petition to 
delay approval of Apotex’s competing generic.56 Section A of this Part dis-
                                                                                                                           
 49 Id. at 55, 58; Complaint, Apotex Inc v. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., No. 11-cv-08803 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2014). Apotex also alleged in a separate claim that Acorda’s representations on 
its label for Zanaflex Capsules constituted false advertising in violation of the Lanham Act, but the 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant Acorda. Apotex, 823 F.3d at 55, 58. 
 50 Apotex, 823 F.3d at 58. 
 51 Id.; Amended Complaint at 6–9, Apotex, No. 11-cv-08803. 
 52 Apotex, 823 F.3d at 58; Apotex, No. 11-cv-08803, slip. op. at 8. 
 53 Apotex, 823 F.3d at 58; Apotex, No. 11-cv-08803, slip. op. at 6–7; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(q) 
(2012) (providing that “the Secretary shall not delay approval” of an ANDA unless a citizen peti-
tion is filed and the Secretary of Health and Human Services determines that “delay is necessary 
to protect the public health”). 
 54 Apotex, No. 11-cv-08803, slip. op. at 8, 14. 
 55 See Lipstein et al., supra note 5, at 15 (explaining that the tension between brand-name and 
generic manufacturers has led to a litany of antitrust litigation). 
 56 823 F.3d 51, 62 (2d Cir. 2016). 
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cusses prior Second Circuit precedent applying antitrust principles to citizen 
petitions, and the FDA’s recent interpretative guidance (“Guidance for In-
dustry”).57 Section B discusses the Second Circuit’s evaluation of the FDA 
Guidance for Industry and the reasoning in Apotex behind its holding that 
the evidence at bar was insufficient to state a claim for an antitrust violation 
under Section Two of the Sherman Act.58  
A. In re DDAVP and the FDA Guidance for Industry on Citizen Petitions 
The Noerr-Pennington antitrust immunity doctrine does not protect 
sham litigation and indeed, the Second Circuit has specifically held that 
sham citizen suits can be analogized to sham litigation and form the basis of 
a claim for a violation of Section Two of the Sherman Act.59 In 2009, in In 
re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit heard a case with very similar facts to Apotex that 
involved a generic drug application that the FDA approved on the same day 
that the FDA denied the citizen petition, leading to the inference that the 
petition had played a role in delaying approval of the generic.60  
In re DDAVP involved a suit by a class of direct purchasers who al-
leged that the defendant manufacturer, a licensee of antidiuretic DDAVP 
tablets, suppressed generic competition by filing a sham citizen petition to 
delay a generic competitor’s ANDA, all for the purpose of inflating the 
price the defendant could charge for DDAVP.61 The Second Circuit held 
that the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to state a claim for antitrust 
liability based on a theory that the defendant’s citizen petition was a sham.62 
In November 2014, after In re DDAVP, the FDA released Guidance for 
Industry, a document that the Second Circuit deemed persuasive in reaching 
its decisions in Apotex.63 The FDA Guidance for Industry outlines the 
FDA’s interpretation of Section 355(q) of the FDCA with respect to citizen 
                                                                                                                           
 57 See infra 59–67 and accompanying text. 
 58 See infra 68–73 and accompanying text. 
 59 See In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 694–95 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(noting that although sham litigation and sham administrative petitions are not identical, a petition 
that is both objectively and subjectively a sham can serve as the basis for antitrust liability). 
 60 See id. at 687 (noting that the defendant’s intent and the legitimacy of the defendant’s citi-
zen petition were called into question by the fact that the defendant refused to withdraw or amend 
their petition for five months after they lost their patent challenge, which had been the basis of 
their petition). 
 61 Id. at 682–83. 
 62 Id. at 695. 
 63 Apotex, 823 F.3d at 59–60; see GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 8, at 14 (explaining 
that because the FDA’s response to a filed citizen suit is considered final agency action, it is sub-
ject to immediate judicial review which means that the affected ANDA applicant would lose any 
notice of an opportunity for hearing and subsequent process that they would otherwise be guaran-
teed at the agency level). 
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petitions and, in particular, how citizen petitions related to a pending ANDA 
are to be evaluated.64 Guidance for Industry states that, with respect to the 
timing of an ANDA review and a citizen petition, the FDA’s priority is to 
protect the procedural rights of ANDA applicants to challenge adverse 
agency decisions with respect to their application, including notice of an 
opportunity for a hearing.65 Because a ruling on a citizen petition is consid-
ered final agency action reviewable only by the courts, a FDA ruling on a 
citizen petition before a FDA decision on whether to grant an ANDA would 
leave the ANDA applicant unable to challenge the FDA’s finding at the 
agency level.66 Thus, according to Guidance for Industry, the FDA prefers 
to wait to decide on a citizen petition until after it renders a decision on the 
ANDA application at issue.67 
B. The Second Circuit’s Reasoning in Apotex 
In Apotex, the Second Circuit unanimously affirmed the district court’s 
decision after a de novo review, denying generic drug manufacturer Apo-
tex’s claim that brand-name drug manufacturer Acorda had filed a sham 
citizen petition in violation of U.S. antitrust law.68 The key issue in Apotex 
was whether the brand-name manufacturer’s citizen petition was objectively 
and subjectively baseless and therefore a sham litigation that could serve as 
the sole basis of an antitrust claim.69  
The Second Circuit held that Apotex had failed to meet the first prong 
of the test because it had not shown that Acorda’s citizen petition was ob-
jectively baseless.70 Because both prongs of the test need to be satisfied in 
order to show litigation is a sham, it was therefore unnecessary for the Sec-
ond Circuit to go on to consider whether the citizen suit also constituted a 
subjective sham.71 
In light of the Guidance, the Second Circuit held that the FDA’s ac-
tions with respect to approving the ANDA application and ruling on the 
                                                                                                                           
 64 21 U.S.C. § 355(q) (2012); GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 8, at 1. 
 65 GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 8, at 13–14. 
 66 Id. 
 67 See id. (noting that responding to a citizen petition could well interfere with both the appli-
cation review process, as well as the applicant’s procedural rights to challenge agency determina-
tions). 
 68 823 F.3d at 62. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 59; see also Prof’l Real Estate Inv’rs, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 
49, 60–61 (1993) (holding that for a lawsuit to be considered a sham capable of violating antitrust 
law, it must be (1) objectively baseless such that no reasonable person would expect to win on the 
merits, and (2) be a subjective attempt by the filing party to directly interfere with a competitor’s 
business). 
 71 Apotex, 823 F.3d at 59. 
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brand-name manufacturer’s citizen suit reflected a concerted effort by the 
FDA to protect the generic manufacturer’s procedural rights with respect to 
its ANDA application.72 Because the FDA Guidance suggests that the FDA 
prefers to rule on citizen suits and the implicated ANDA application con-
temporaneously in order to protect ANDA applicants’ review rights, the 
Second Circuit held that it was significantly less likely for Acorda’s citizen 
petition to have been a sham and used in an anticompetitive fashion.73 Thus, 
the Second Circuit ultimately ruled that the generic manufacturer had not 
stated a claim under Section Two of the Sherman Act and that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in its disposition of the case.74 
III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS OF FDA GUIDANCE MISAPPLIES 
U.S. ANTITRUST LAW AND INCENTIVIZES DILATORY SHAM LITIGATION 
Despite the factual similarity to its own precedent, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit in 2016, in Apotex Inc. v. Acorda Therapeu-
tics, Inc., dismissed a generic drug manufacturer’s claim that a brand-name 
drug manufacturer violated U.S. antitrust law by filing a sham citizen suit to 
delay the FDA’s approval of the generic.75 In so deciding, the Second Cir-
cuit effectively raised the burden of proof for showing a particular citizen 
suit is a sham by reducing the presumptive weight it had previously afford-
ed to the timing of the FDA’s decisions.76 After Apotex, the significance of 
the timing of the FDA’s review of an ANDA and its disposition of a related 
citizen suit has been downgraded from sufficient to state a claim of sham 
litigation to merely relevant in that assessment.77 Despite the fact that the 
Second Circuit had held that the petitioners in 2009 in In re DDAVP Direct 
                                                                                                                           
 72 Id. at 60. If the FDA, after its review of an IND or ANDA, determines that the application 
cannot be approved in its current state because it is deficient in some manner, applicants are enti-
tled to notice of an opportunity for a hearing on the matter so that they may challenge the FDA’s 
determination. Id. 
 73 Id. at 60–61. 
 74 Id. at 62. 
 75 Compare Apotex Inc. v. Acorda Therapeutics, 823 F.3d 51, 61–62 (2d Cir. 2016) (distin-
guishing prior precedent in light of the FDA’s newly published administrative guidance), with In 
re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677, 685–86 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that 
the plaintiff purchasers had sufficiently stated a claim for sham litigation). 
 76 Compare Apotex, 823 F.3d at 61 (noting that Apotex had pled no other facts aside from the 
timing of the FDA’s actions to prove that Acorda’s citizen suit was both objectively and subjec-
tively a sham), with In re DDAVP, 585 F.3d at 694 (holding that plaintiffs had stated a claim for 
sham litigation and noting that even though the FDA ultimately rejected the citizen petition, the 
possibility that the petition delayed generic competition was more probable since the FDA reject-
ed the petition and approved the generic on the same day). As Apotex failed to present other facts 
from which the court could plausibly infer that the brand-name manufacturer’s citizen suit was a 
sham, the Second Circuit determined that the timing argument was insufficient alone to overturn 
the district court’s ruling in favor of the brand-name manufacturer. Apotex, 823 F.3d at 61. 
 77 Apotex, 823 F.3d at 60–61. 
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Purchaser Antitrust Litigation had stated a claim for sham litigation based 
purely on the timing of the FDA’s actions, the Second Circuit in Apotex 
suggested that such evidence is not enough and that plaintiffs must plead 
additional facts that the petition is baseless in order to survive a motion to 
dismiss.78 
Although the FDA Guidance that the Second Circuit relied on is cer-
tainly persuasive authority, it is, by its own terms, nonbinding.79 Even as-
suming, arguendo, that the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the FDA 
Guidance was correct, its decision in Apotex risks undermining the very 
goals that the Sherman Act and the Hatch-Waxman Act were designed to 
achieve.80 The Sherman Act, like the other U.S. antitrust laws, was enacted 
to protect competition and consumer welfare and ensure that businesses 
have sufficient incentives to compete on both price and quality.81 The 
Hatch-Waxman Act was designed in part to provide the public with access 
to lower cost drugs upon the expiration of a brand-name drug’s exclusivity 
period.82 Both statutes were therefore designed specifically to help promote 
free competition in furtherance of the public welfare.83  
Generics are not only much cheaper than brand-name drugs, but each 
generic that enters the market puts additional downward pressure on the 
price of the incumbent brand-name drug.84 The Second Circuit’s ruling that 
                                                                                                                           
 78 Id. at 61. But see In re DDAVP, 585 F.3d at 694 (noting that the likelihood that a sham 
petition actually delayed generic competition is heightened when the FDA approves the generic 
drug on the same day that it rejected the citizen petition). 
 79 See generally GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 7 (stating in the header of each page 
that the document “Contains Nonbinding Recommendations”). 
 80 The Antitrust Laws, supra note 35 (explaining that the Sherman Act was designed to be a 
“comprehensive charter of economic liberty” with the goal of protecting unrestrained competi-
tion); see also Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments), supra note 3 (noting that the Hatch-Waxman Act was intended to maintain existing 
incentives for brand-name drug manufacturers to innovate while allowing consumers to be able to 
purchase cheaper generic versions of brand-name drugs after patent and marketing exclusivity 
expiration in a more expedient fashion). The formal name for the Hatch-Waxman Act, “Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984” clearly expresses that at least one goal in 
creating an easier, shorter process for generic approval was to increase competition for high-priced 
brand-name drugs. Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C § 355). 
 81 The Antitrust Laws, supra note 35. 
 82 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments), supra note 3. 
 83 Id.; The Antitrust Laws, supra note 35. 
 84 Generic Competition and Drug Prices, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/
OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDER/ucm129385.htm [https://perma.cc/Z42Q-NRMR]. In 
a study covering 1999 through 2004, researchers found that although the first generic was priced 
only slightly below the brand-name price, the second generic to enter the market had a dramatic 
impact, with a price that was fifty-two percent of the price of the brand-name drug. Id.; see Apo-
tex, 823 F.3d at 55 (stating that generic entry may be motivated by developing a drug with fewer 
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there was insufficient evidence to infer that Acorda’s citizen petition was 
being deployed as an anticompetitive weapon against Apotex risks harming 
not only the health and viability of generic drug manufacturers like Apotex 
going forward, but the American public as well.85 The Second Circuit’s rul-
ing in Apotex will hurt generic manufacturers in the short and long-run, be-
cause brand-name manufacturers, seeing the increased degree of difficulty 
facing generic manufacturers to prove sham suits, may choose to follow 
Acorda’s lead and file their own citizen suits whenever generic manufactur-
ers attempt to enter the market.86 The purpose of the brand-name manufac-
turer’s citizen suit would be to extend its exclusivity period, which would 
undermine generic competition in contravention of the goals of the Hatch-
Waxman Act.87 Should that reality come to pass, the public will be harmed, 
as they will be forced to pay for high-priced brand-name drugs longer than 
the law intends.88 
CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s 2016 decision in 
Apotex Inc. v. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc.—that the FDA’s simultaneous 
granting of a generic ANDA and denial of a brand-name’s citizen petition is 
insufficient evidence to infer that the citizen petition was deployed as an 
anticompetitive weapon—risks harming not only the health and viability of 
generic drug manufacturers, but the American public as well. By devaluing 
the presumptive weight previously afforded to the precise timing of the 
FDA’s disposition of citizen suits and ANDA approvals, the Second Circuit 
has made it considerably more difficult for parties to prove that a particular 
citizen suit is a sham and thus an anticompetitive weapon of the type pro-
hibited by the Sherman Act. 
The Second Circuit’s ruling creates a perverse incentive that may in-
duce other brand-name drug companies seeking to extend the life of their 
monopolies to file their own citizen suits with the sole purpose of under-
mining their generic competitors. In such circumstances, the public will be 
                                                                                                                           
side effects, as both Apotex and Acorda sought to develop a capsule form of tizanidine to reduce 
the drowsiness associated with their tablets). 
 85 See Lipstein et al., supra note 5, at 15 (observing that the natural tension between brand-
name and generic manufacturers that Hatch-Waxman Act created has led to an explosion of patent 
infringement cases and antitrust counterclaims). 
 86 See Carrier & Wander, supra note 7, at 256, 259 (hypothesizing that, notwithstanding the 
fact that most citizen petitions are ultimately denied, a significant number of citizen petitions are 
brought by brand-name drug companies simply to delay generic competitors). 
 87 See id. at 254–55 (noting that Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act to increase generic 
competition). 
 88 See id. at 254–56 (noting that the Hatch-Waxman Act has increased generic penetration in 
brand-name drug markets and has led to a significant decrease in the average price of those drugs). 
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forced to continue to pay for higher-priced brand-name drugs, as there will 
be no other choices in the absence of generic competitors. 
Apotex not only represents a stark departure from recent case prece-
dent, but the Second Circuit’s holding is also contrary to the intent of Con-
gress in enacting the Hatch-Waxman Act and the Sherman Act, both of 
which were intended to protect the public by ensuring unfettered operation 
of the free market system and preservation of consumer choice. In the con-
text of the prescription drug market and given the public health ramifica-
tions, it is especially vital that U.S. courts consider the underlying policies 
of the statutes they are interpreting or else risk greater harm to the public by 
their oversight. 
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